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1 Introduction
Many international economists and economic geographers highlight the importance of
market externalities in the location of economic activities between and within countries.
They explain how the endogenous agglomeration of economic activities in specic locales
can be the result of specic linkages. While forward linkages (or supply linkages) entice
consumers to locate closer to producers in order to benet from a larger diversity of less
expensive products, backward linkages (or demand linkages) entice the producers to locate
closer to their nal consumers or client rms in order to save on transport costs (Krugman
1991, Krugman and Venables 1995). Such a literature contrasts with the urban economic
literature that traditionally discusses the endogenous formation of cities in the light of
non-market externalities. In particular, cities are seen as business information centers or
social interaction centers that build on the agglomeration forces stemming from human in-
teractions, face-to-face communications or exogenous technological spillovers (Beckmann,
1976; OHara, 1977; Ogawa and Fujita, 1980, Fujita and Ogawa, 1982; Lucas and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2001; Mossay and Picard, 2009). In this context, agents have incentives to
locate close to each others because proximity to other agents increases the e¢ ciency of
communications and interactions.
Non-market face-to-face interaction is certainly an important factor of the formation
of many central business districts, but it is probably not the sole driver of the economic
agglomeration process within most city centers. For instance, Tabuchi and Fujita (1997)
study the face-to-face interactions that are likely to take place within headquarters and
central functions of Japanese rms. However, by the time of their study, most of those
activities were concentrated in Tokyo and Osaka. As a result, face-to-face interactions
between headquarters are most probably not the main agglomeration driver in all other
Japanese cites that counted each more than a million residents. By contrast, there is evi-
dence of vertical linkages (or input-output linkages) in cities. Indeed, most cities consume
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a signicant share of their own production. For example, in 2000, a prefecture like Tokyo
sold some 33% and 30% of its production to its own residents and rms whereas it sold
only 7% and 29% to residents and rms outside the prefecture. In line with this idea,
we observe that large cities generate a signicant share of the market potential for their
own rms. Mathae and Shwachman (2009) compute the market potentials of EU regions
(NUTS 2) as the transportation-cost-weighted market capacities of each region and break
down those market potentials according to the share generated by the region itself, its
neighboring regions, and the rest of EU regions. Those authors show that the economic
activities of regions hosting a large city signicantly contributes their own market poten-
tial. Drawing on this study, the economic activities of the regions of Inner London and
Brussels-Capital contribute up to 78% and 75% of the own market potential that their
rms can access.1 Knowing that the metropolitan areas of London and Brussels are geo-
graphically larger than the regions of Inner London and Brussels-Captial, one can safely
conclude that London and Brussels signicantly contributes their own market potentials.
The same conclusion is likely to apply for the other major EU cities because they are
most often the unique signicant metropolitan areas of their regions.
This paper investigates the spatial structure of a city subject to backward and vertical
linkages. We consider endogenous urban location of individuals and rms who consume
the set of di¤erentiated goods or services that they produce. We present a model where
residents have hyperbolic preferences for residential space and quadratic preferences for
di¤erentiated varieties of goods or services and where residents work in the rms that
produce and sell those varieties under monopolistic competition. Firms hire their work-
force around their production sites while they ship and sell products or o¤er their services
directly to consumers. This set-up allows us to study how the urban structure is shaped
by forward and backward linkages: rms move to regions where intermediate goods or
1We gratefully thank Dr Mattae and the Central Bank of Luxembourg for the supply of disagregated
data.
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production factors are supplied with low prices and rms are attracted by regions where
their intermediate or nal goods is highly demanded.
Due to the linkages, rms prefer to locate and hire labor in locales closer to consumers
and other rms that also purchase their intermediate output but compete with them. As a
result, rms and workers tend to co-agglomerate and form a city center endogenously. We
characterize and discuss the shape of the residential distribution in such cities on a one-
and two-dimension geographical spaces (linear and planar cities). We show that residential
distribution is continuous, symmetric and single-peaked. To our knowledge, this is the rst
formal model of urban spatial structure based on a microeconomic foundation of forward
and backward linkages in the framework of new economic geography. We furthermore
disentangle the impact of supply linkages from nal demand linkages and show that both
e¤ects foster the agglomeration and raise land rents within cities.
The paper relates to the literature as follows. Since the pioneering work of von Thü-
nen (1826), the study of urban structure has often focused on the assumption of central
business districts, where rms locate on a spaceless point as in Alonsos (1964) residential
location theory and on a set of such points as in Fujita and Krugmans (1995) new eco-
nomic geography. In those models, the spatial distribution inside a city center(s) remains
an unsolved issue. On the other hand, the formation of city and the distribution of urban
activities within a city have been the focus of a small set of contributions initiated by
Beckmann (1976) and followed by Ogawa and Fujita (1980), Tauchen and Witte (1984),
Tabuchi (1986) and Mossay and Picard (2009). These studies have paid attention to the
impact of social interactions and technological externalities on urban structure mainly
through face-to-face communications that enhance the productivity of pairs of rms or
workers. Whereas the production mechanisms of face-to-face communications modeled
in those studies have produced convenient analytical properties, they remain black boxes
because they do not take into account the actual nature of economic interactions within
a city. In a similar vein, Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) model the positive pecu-
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niary externalities between the rms as exogenous spillovers that decay with distance. To
our knowledge, none of those contributions have opened the black box of the externalities
accruing between the rms. By contrast, this paper presents some microeconomic founda-
tion of the pecuniary externalities that generate backward and forward linkages developed
by Krugman (1991), Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Krugman and Venables (1995). In such
microeconomic foundations, the prices of goods and services are determined in general
equilibrium under monopolistically competitive markets.
The new economic geography literature o¤ers only a small set of theoretical studies on
rmsspatial distribution over a continuous space. The scarcity of such a research mainly
results from the analytical di¢ culties involved in the study of location incentives on a
spatial continuum. In particular, Fujita et al. (1999) and Mossay (2003) have reduced
the study to uniform distributions of rms (at earth) while Picard and Tabuchi (2010)
have enlarged it to a larger class of spatial distributions. Because of the absence of pref-
erence for residential space, those authors nd that continuous equilibrium distributions
are most often intrinsically unstable. This suggests that economic activities must agglom-
erate in spaceless points, which are then called cities. By contrast, this paper introduces
preferences for residential space and shows existence of a unique equilibrium distribution
of rms and workers, that is continuous, symmetric and single-peaked.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the urban
model with nal demand linkages. Section 3 characterizes spatial equilibrium of the
model, while Sections 4 and 5 apply this discussion to the one- and two-dimension space
set-ups. Section 6 extends the previous set-up to vertical linkages and to exporting cities.
Section 7 compares the spatial equilibrium to the socially optimal conguration of a city.
Section 8 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
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2 The Model
We assume two sets of perfectly mobile individuals and di¤erentiated product varieties
whose residence and production are distributed on a geographical compact space X  <X ,
X = 1; 2. On the one hand, the mass of individuals residing at location x is dened by
the density function (x), where x 2 X is the individuals coordinate. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the total mass of individuals is unity:
R
X (x)dx = 1. On the
other hand, each variety is produced at a single location with coordinate y 2 X while the
mass of varieties produced at location y is dened by the distribution function (y). The
total mass of varieties is given by M =
R
X (y)dy. Product varieties can be interpreted
as services. In the case of a two-dimensional geographical space X , x and y are the
vectors of coordinates (x1; x2) and (y1; y2) whereas (x)dx and (y)dy are equivalent to
(x1; x2)dx1dx2 and (y1; y2)dy1dy2.
2.1 Consumerspreferences and demands
Individuals consume the di¤erentiated product varieties, residential space and a numéraire
good. The preferences of an individual located at location x are given by the following
utility function:
U [q0; q (; x) ; s(x)] = C [q (; x)]  
2
1
s(x)
+ q0
where q0 is the consumption for numéraire, s(x) is the consumption for space, q (; x) is
the consumption prole for di¤erentiated product varieties that are o¤ered at location
x, and C [q (; x)] is a composite good function aggregating those product varieties. The
parameter  reects the preference for residential space, a larger  implying a stronger
preference for space. The preference for space reects a decreasing marginal utility from
use of residential space.2 The preference for residential space acts as a dispersion force in
2The present hyperbolic preference for space and the Beckmanns (1976) logarithmic preference for
space are two instances of the same class of preferences (s1    1)= (1  ) where  = 2 and  ! 1
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this model.3
As in Ottaviano et al. (2002) the composite good is expressed as
C [q (; x)] = 
Z
X
q(y; x)(y)dy   
2
Z
X
[q(y; x)]2 (y)dy   
2
Z
X
q(y; x)(y)dy
2
This function is made of individual consumption q (y; x) of a variety produced at location
y and consumed at location x. In this expression,  > 0,  > 0 and  > 0 are parameters
reecting the preference for the goods or services. Ceteris paribus, a higher  implies
a more intense preference towards the varieties compared to the numéraire, a higher 
means a more bias toward a dispersed consumption of varieties (i.e. the love for variety),
and a higher  implies a higher degree of substitutability between varieties.
The budget constraint of an individual located at x is equal toZ
X
p(y; x)q(y; x)(y)dy +R(x)s(x) + q0  w(x) + q0 (1)
where p(y; x) is the price of a variety produced at location y sold at location x, R(x) is
the land rent, w(x) is the individuals income when she resides at location x, and q0 is her
initial endowment of numéraire. We assume that the endowment q0 is large enough so
that consumers have positive demands for the numéraire in equilibrium. We also assume
that product varieties are exchanged for any congurations of rms and consumers. We
now present the production side of the economy.
respectively, which yield iso-elastic demands for residential space with price elasticity respectively equal to
1=2 and 1. So, the present hyperbolic preference represents an intermediate setting between Beckmanns
demand and the inelastic demand for residential space that is regularly used in standard urban economics
(e.g. Fujita and Ogawa 1980). As will be shown below, the hyperbolic sub-utility for space yields more
convenient analytical properties.
3In new economic geography, the dispersion force is usually obtained by the assumption of productive
land that creates a localized demand for workers in the farming sector. This analytically convenient as-
sumption is often criticized on the ground that farming products must be undi¤erentiated and transported
at zero cost (see e.g. Fujita et al. 1999, Picard and Zeng 2005).
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2.2 Production
Each rm produces a single variety of goods or services, sets the prices of its goods or
services and delivers them to the consumer locations incurring a transport cost. Each rm
faces a monopolistic competition in the following sense. First, it faces price competition
with other rms that sell imperfect substitutes. Second, because the mass of each rm is
negligible in the whole market, it cannot determine its price strategically. Finally, there
exist many potential rms that enter until prots fall to zero.
As in most modern cities, each rm uses some intermediate inputs that are produced
in the city. Like Krugman and Venables (1995), we make things simple by assuming
that rms use the same set of di¤erentiated goods or services as those purchased by nal
consumers and that their benets from using those goods or services take the same form as
the consumerspreferences. To be more precise, we now assume that production requires
no variable inputs (without loss of generality as in Ottaviano et al. 2002) but that it
requires three di¤erent xed inputs: labor, physical capital equipment and intermediate
goods or services. We assume that, a rm producing at location y must hire an inelastic
unit of labor and pay a wage w(y). We assume that a too high commuting cost to entice
workers to commute. Hence, each worker resides at the same place as its rm.4 As a
result, when the labor market clears, the mass of varieties is equal to the mass of workers:
M = 1 and (y) = (y).
In addition, to build up and use its production equipment, the rm must acquire
the K units of physical capital which costs K units of numéraire. Alternatively, the
rm can buy qi(; y) units of intermediate goods at a price p(; y) to reduce its cost of
physical capital or operation. Physical capital and intermediate goods are therefore input
substitutes. One interpretation is that a part of the physical capital can be replicated by
4The study of commuting patterns is out of the scope of the current paper. See Ogawa and Fujita
(1980) and Fujita and Ogawa (1982), among others, for spatial structure with commuting.
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a set of intermediate inputs at a lower cost. More specically, the use of a set of qi(; y)
intermediate inputs reduces the requirement for physical capital to K C[qi(; y)] units of
numéraire where C[qi(; y)] takes the same form as the composite good in the consumers
preferences. Such an assumption replicates Krugman and Venables(1995) assumption
on rmsproduction functions to Ottaviano et al.s (2002) quadratic utility model. Note
that rms use no space.
Given this set-up, the rm located at y maximizes a prot (y) = e(y)   f(y) that
embeds the operating prot
e(y) 
Z
X
[p(y; x)  (y; x)] qc(y; x) (x) + qi(y; x) (x) dx (2)
and the xed cost
f(y)  K   C[qi(; y)] +
Z
X
p(z; y)qi(z; y)(z)dz + w(y) (3)
where qc(y; x) is the demand of a good produced at location y by consumers at location
x and (y; x) is the unit transport cost from locations y to x. The rm thus makes two
choices: one about its prices p(y; ) and one about its own demand qi(; y) of intermediate
inputs to other rms. Because the former decision a¤ects operating prots and the latter
xed costs, the two decisions can be disentangled into operating prot maximization and
cost minimization. We rst analyze the latter decision.
We rst discuss the short-run equilibrium where land, product and labor markets clear.
We then discuss the long run spatial equilibrium where rms and workers relocate within
the city.
3 Short run equilibrium
In this section we consider the individuals demands for products or services and for
residential space, the rmsdemands for intermediate inputs and nally the market prices
and prots. We nally determine the individuals location incentives within the city.
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3.1 Product and land demands
Following the tradition of urban economic models à la Alonso (1964), assume that land is
owned by absentee landlords who do not participate in production and consumption. The
behavior of landlords dictates the consumption behaviors of residents. Indeed, because
landlords extract the maximum land rent, the bid rent at location x is dened as
	(x) = max
s(x);q(;x);qo(x)
w(x) + q0   q0  
R
X p(y; x)q(y; x)(y)dy
s(x)
from (1).Since no resident wishes to relocate in the city in equilibrium, the bid rent
is subject to the constraint that the residents utility U(q0; q (; x) ; x) is no less than
the equilibrium utility U. The bid rent is in fact the ratio between the net expenses
on residential space (numerator) and the residential space consumption (denominator).
Maximization of the bid rent 	(x) with respect to q0 is to solve U = U(q0; q (; x) ; x) for
q0 and plug this solution into 	(x), which yields
	(x) = max
s(x);q(;x)
w(x) + q0   2 1s(x)   U + C [q (; x)] 
R
X p(y; x)q(y; x)(y)dy
s(x)
Maximizing	(x) with respect to q (; x)yields the individual consumption of residential
space and varieties of goods and services as follows. We rst solve for q (; x) to obtain
the individuals demand:
qc(y; x) =

 + 
  1

p(y; x) +

 ( + )
P (x)
where the superscript c stands for nal consumers and P (x) =
R
X p(y; x)(y)dy is the
price index for consumers at location x (see Picard and Tabuchi, 2010). The consumer
surplus that an individual located at x obtains from consuming the di¤erentiated goods
is given by
S [p (; x)] = 
2
2 ( + )
  
 + 
Z
X
p (y; x)(y)dy
  
2 ( + )
Z
X
p (y; x)(y)dy
2
+
1
2
Z
X
[p (y; x)]2 (y)dy
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which depends on the price prole p (; x). Plugging those equilibrium values in the utility
function yields
V (x) = w(x) + S [p (; x)]   1
s(x)
+ q0 (4)
and the bid rent
	(x) = max
s(x)
w(x) + q0   2 1s(x)   U + S [p (; x)]
s(x)
Then, we solve for s(x) to get the demand for residential space: s(x) = =[w(x) + q0  
U + S [p (; x)]]. Finally, the equilibrium rent is equal to the bid rent: R(x) = 	(x).
Hence, the land rent is determined as
R(x) =

2
1
s(x)2
(5)
We now turn to the rmsdemand for intermediate inputs and to their prices decisions.
3.2 Intermediate input demands and equilibrium prices
The rms cost minimization has the same form as the consumers utility maximization.
It therefore yields a rms consumption of
qi(y; x) =

 + 
  1

p(y; x) +

 ( + )
P (x)
units of intermediate inputs, which is the same as the consumerconsumption qc(z; y).
The minimized xed cost (3) is then given by
K   S [p (; y)] + w(y) (6)
That is, the minimized xed cost is equal to the cost of physical capital K minus the cost
savings S [p (; y)] plus the wages to workers w(y).
We can now establish the prices that rms set for their consumers and client rms.
The demand addressed to each rm located at y is equal to qt(y; x)  qc(y; x) + qi(y; x) =
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2qc(y; x). The rm located at y nds the price prole p(y; ) that maximizes it operating
prot e(y) in (2). The rst-order condition for prot maximization yields the optimal
price of variety produced at location y and sold to a consumer residing at location x:
p (y; x) = p (x) +
1
2
 (y; x) where p (x) =
2 + 
R
X  (y; x)(y)dy
2 (2 + )
(7)
At the equilibrium the demand is equal to qt(y; x) = 2 [p (y; x)   (y; x)] = so that the
operating prot is given by
e(y) =
2

Z
X
[p (y; x)   (y; x)]2  (x) dx
In the long run, entry occurs until rms earn zero prot. This means that (y) = 0
in any location y where a rm can set up its production activity. Using (6),the wage paid
by a rm at location y should then be equal to
w (y) = e(y) K + S[p(; y)] (8)
The presence of vertical linkages impacts on the workers wage in two ways. First, it
increases the operating prote(y) because her production is sold not only to consumers
but also to other rms. Second, it increases her rms prot through the capital savings
that are induced by the use of intermediate inputs. Those capital savings take the same
form as her own surplus from consumption.
As mentioned above, we impose that product varieties can be exchanged for any pair
of locations and for any distribution of rms and consumers. This means that the rms
prices net of transport costs on a variety produced in x and sold in y are always positive,
i.e.,
p (y; x)   (y; x) > 0 8y; x
Let B  X be the support of the city and let the maximal distance between any two
points of B be 2b  maxx;y2B T (x  y). Then, the possibility of exchanging varieties from
any location requires that
 (2b)2 <
2
2 + 
(9)
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Note that the feasible exchange condition (9) involves endogenous variable b that must
be replaced by the equilibrium value. This is determined in later sections.
3.3 Location incentives
In this model, workers reside at their rms location. Because of xed labor requirements,
rms and workers have the same spatial distribution. As a result the spatial distribution
of rms is driven by the location of workers (x). The workersincentives to reside in
some locations are given by their utility di¤erentials. We here collect the above results to
establish their utility level when product markets, land market and labor markets clear.
Because each unit of geographical space hosts (x) rms that each hires a unit mass
of individuals, each individual uses s(x) = 1=(x) units of space. As a results, we can
write the consumer-workers indirect utility function (4) as
V (x) = w(x) + S [p (; x)]  (x) + q0
which includes its surplus from consumption, its wage and the residential disutility that
more dense locales imposes on him through higher land rents. Using the equilibrium wage
(8), we nally get
V (x) = e(x) + 2S [p (; x)]  (x) K + q0 (10)
The presence of vertical linkages increases the operating prots e(y) because the produc-
tion is sold to both consumers and rms and it doubles the consumer surplus S [p (; x)]
because intermediate inputs allow capital cost savings that are exactly equal to the con-
sumer surplus (as in Krugman and Venables,1995).
We nally break down the transport cost from locations x to y as
 (x; y)  T (x  y)
where  is the amplitude of transportation costs and T captures the shape of transport
costs. Collecting the above results, the consumer-workers indirect utility can be rewritten
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as the following function of () and x
V (x) = W0  W1f1(x) +W2f2(x) W3f3(x) W4 [f1(x)]2  W5 (x) (11)
where f1; f2 and f3 are three accessibility measuresdened as
f1(x) 
Z
X
T (x  z) (z) dz
f2(x) 
Z
X
[T (x  z)]2  (z) dz
f3(x) 
Z
XX
T (x  y)T (y   z) (y) (z) dydz
and where W0 is a constant and
W1 =
2 (3 + 2)
(2 + )2
W2 =
3 2
4
W3 =
 2
 (2 + )
W4 =
 22
4 (2 + )2
W5 = 
All constants Wjs are all positive and genericallydi¤erent from zero in the sense that
Wj > 0 for any non-zero measure of parameters (; ; ;  ; ) (see Picard and Tabuchi,
2007 and 2010). Note that expression (11) applies for any dimension of the geographical
space, X .
We are now equipped to analyze the long-run spatial equilibrium.
4 Spatial equilibrium
In a spatial equilibrium, workers have no incentives to relocate and therefore get the same
utility level everywhere. Formally, a spatial equilibrium is such that (x) > 0 if V (x) = V
and (x) = 0 if V (x) < V . To our knowledge, the spatial equilibrium condition V (x) = V
has no explicit solution for the spatial distribution (x) for a general class of transport
cost functions. Yet, one important class of spatial distribution is readily spotted for the
following quadratic transport costs:
T (x  y)  kx  yk2 =
8><>: (x  y)
2 if X = 1
(x1   y1)2 + (x2   y2)2 if X = 2
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where x denotes the coordinates of a consumer, y the coordinates of a rm, and kk the
Euclidean distance. Such transport cost functions are commonly used in Hotelling models
and its various applications (see Anderson et al. 1992). Economides (1986) has discussed
the analytical di¢ culties and absence of pure strategy equilibrium under non-quadratic
transport cost functions. Quadratic transport cost functions imply that travel/shipping
costs increase more than proportionally with distance. This is likely to be the case in a city
where larger distance implies changes of modes of transportation and higher travel/ship
cost. For instance, activities requiring close distance can be done by foot, those requiring
longer distance needs to combine foot and metro or buses whereas much longer distance
require additional change of metro or buses.
Under quadratic costs, the accessibility measures become
f1(x) =
Z
B
kx  zk2  (z) dz
f2(x) =
Z
B
kx  zk4  (z) dz
f3(x) =
Z
BB
kx  yk2 ky   zk2  (y) (z) dydz
which are polynomials of x of order 2, 4 and 2, respectively. Similarly, the expression
[f1(x)]
2 is a polynomial of x of order 4. As a result, because the spatial equilibrium
imposes V (x) = V 8x 2 B, the spatial equilibrium distribution of workers (x) must also
be a polynomial of order 4.
Lemma 1 Under quadratic transport costs, the equilibrium distribution of workers (x)
is a polynomial of order 4.
In the case of a unidimensional geographical space (X = 1), the equilibrium distribu-
tion of workers is equal to
(x) =
4X
k=0
akx
k (12)
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where ak 2 <. In the case of a bidimensional geographical space (X = 2), it is equal to
(x1; x2) =
4X
k=0
kX
`=0
ak`x
`
1x
k `
2 (13)
where ak` 2 <.
As a corollary, the support B of the city must be a bounded and convex set. Indeed,
the fact that (x) is a polynomial implies that fx : (x) > 0g is a convex open set and
the same fact combined with
R
B (x)dx = 1 implies that fx : (x) > 0g is a bounded set.
5 Linear city
We now study the case of a linear city that spreads on the space X = <. We normalize
the city width to unity so that (x) measures the density of workers residing at location
x 2 <. In other words, any rectangular space dx 1 of the city includes (x)dx workers.
Let the support of the city be B = ( b; b) where b are the city borders, so that workers
are distributed about the location x = 0. We assume that the (farming) opportunity cost
of land is nil. So, the land rent is nil at the city border, which implies that (b) is equal
to 0.
The spatial equilibrium is dened by a spatial distribution function (x), a city
border b and a utility level V

that solve the three equalities V (x) = V

, (b) = 0 andR b
 b 
(x)dx = 1. The rst equality implies that
V 0(x) = 0; V 00(x) = 0; V 000(x) = 0; V 0000(x) = 0 8x 2 B
which can be applied at x = 0 to infer the coe¢ cients (a1; a2; a3; a4) that dene the
polynomial (x) in (12). The equilibrium is therefore obtained in the following way.
First, it can be readily shown that the equalities V 0(x) = 0 and V 000(x) = 0 imply that the
coe¢ cients a1 and a3 are both equal to zero, which conrms that the spatial distribution
is symmetric about x = 0. Second, simultaneously solving V 0000(x) = 0, (b) = 0 and
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R b
 b (x)dx = 1 we can get the workersspatial distribution:
(x) = 
h 
x2   c1
2   (c2)2i (14)
where
c1   a2
2a4
=
24b5+ 15
40b3
and c2 
s
a22
4a4
  a0

=
15  16b5
40b3
and
  
2

62 + 6 + 2
2 (2 + )2
(15)
Finally, plugging (14) into V 00(x) = 0, we get g (b) = 0 where
g (b)  15752 (2 + )4 2   42002 (2 + )2 (3 + 2) b3 (16)
+ 420 (2 + )2
 
362 + 32 + 2

 2b5
  128  62 + 6 + 2  92 + 7 + 2  4b10
Then, the equilibrium city border b is determined by the solution of g (b) = 0. Although
(16) is 10th-order polynomial, we show in Appendix 1(a) that it has a unique positive
root.
We need to check the condition under which exchanges between any city locations are
feasible at the equilibrium. Using g (b) = 0 and (9), we have
 <
753
p
7(842 + 108 + 352) +
p
C1
2
88200 (2 + )2 2
(17)
where C1  511204 + 1300803 + 12463222 + 533363 + 86074. Therefore, ex-
changes are likely to be feasible between any locations when transport costs are small and
when consumers have intense preferences towards the varieties and weak preferences for
residential space. We assume condition (17) in the sequel of this section.
We can now discuss the urban structure properties. On the one hand, note that,
because (b) = 0, the spatial distribution (x) cannot be increasing at the city border
x = b. Then, because 0(x) = 4x (x2   c1),
0(b)  0 () b2  c1 () 16b5  15 (18)
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so that the city border b cannot exceed 5
p
15=16. On the other hand, it can readily
checked that the spatial distribution (x) describes a single-peaked function on the interval
[ pc1;pc1], which contains the support of the city ( b; b). In addition, Appendix 2
shows that the spatial distribution is concave.
Based upon the foregoing, we establish the following.
Proposition 1 The workersdistribution  (x) in a linear city is unique, single-peaked,
concave and symmetric aboutx = 0.
Intuitively, this means that there can exist a city (with one bump centered on x = 0)
that is necessarily contained in the interval [ b; b]. This also means that there exists
no city with more than one bump if varieties of products or services are accessible from
everywhere in the city.
Next, we the equilibrium land rent (5) is rewritten as
R(x) =

2
(x)2
Because the workersdistribution given by (14) is single-peaked and symmetric about
x = 0 from Proposition 1, the land rent is also single-peaked and symmetric about the
city center. Furthermore, we have R(b) = R0(b) = 0 and
R00(0) =   3
200b4
 
4b5 + 15
  
8b5 + 5

< 0
R00(b) = 
100b4
 
16b5   152 > 0
implying that the land rent is concave near the city center and convex near the city
edges. That is, the equilibrium land rent is bell-shaped, whereas the equilibrium workers
distribution is concave. The concave part of the rent function is also obtained in the
completely integrated conguration in Ogawa and Fujita (1980, Figure 3). The concavity
near the city center results from the fact that the access to all other rms and consumers
are convex in x. The convex part of the rent function is consistent with that in standard
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textbooks of urban economics a la Alonso (1964) and is explained by the substitution
between access and space for land.
We now turn to the comparative statics of the equilibrium urban structure.
Comparative statics The residential density at the city center is given by (0) =
a0 = (4b
5 + 15) =(20b). Di¤erentiating it with respect to b, we get
@(0)
@b
=
16b5   15
20b2
< 0
where the inequality is due to (18). Hence, the city spread 2b is inversely related to the
residential density at the city center.
Using the implicit function theorem and employing the result @g=@b < 0 obtained in
Appendix 1(a), we can derive the following comparative statics for the city border b. It
can be readily veried from expression (16) that @g=@ < 0. It can also be veried that
@g=@ > 0 given g(b) = 0. This can be computed by solving g(b) = 0 for parameter 
and plugging it into @g=@ as:
@g
@

g(b)=0
= 15752 (2 + )4  + 128
 
62 + 6 + 2
  
92 + 7 + 2

 4b10= > 0
Likewise, we can show @g=@ > 0. In sum, we get
db
d
=  @g=@
@g=@b
< 0
db
d
=  @g=@
@g=@b
> 0
db
d
=  @g=@
@g=@b
> 0
That is, more intense preferences towards the varieties reduce the city spread and makes
the city center more dense. Also stronger product substitution between varieties imply a
larger city spread and a lower density near the city center. This is because individuals
value more consuming of the whole set of varieties and entice all rms to locate closer
to them. Finally, stronger preferences for residential space enlarge the city spread and
decrease residential density at the center. This is a so-called suburbanization experienced
in many big cities. The comparative statics with respect to the three parameters agree
with the ndings in new economic geography:
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Proposition 2 The population density near the city center falls and the city borders
expand for less intense preference towards varieties ( smaller), stronger product substi-
tutability ( larger), and stronger preference for residential space ( larger).
6 Planar city
We now study the case of a city that spreads on the bidimensional space X = <2. Without
loss of generality, we suppose that workers are distributed about the location x = 0 and
we let (x) measure the density of workers residing at location x 2 <2. We here show
that the circular city is a spatial equilibrium. Towards this aim we replace the Cartesian
coordinates (x1; x2) by the polar coordinates (r; ') where r is the distance of point x to the
origin (0; 0) and where ' is the respective polar angle with the horizontal axis Ox1. An
innitesimal unit of space dx1dx2 must be converted to rd'dr under polar coordinates.
In a circular city, the individualsdensity function is expressed as (r; ')  (r). The
support of a circular city is B = [0; b] [ ; ] where 2b is equal to the city diameter.
The rst accessibility measure can successively be written as
f1(r; ') =
Z
B

(s cos  r cos')2 + (s sin  r sin')2(s) sdds
=
Z
B
[s+ r   2sr cos ('  )](s) sdds
= 2
Z b
0
 
r2 + s2

(s) sds
where (s; ) 2 B are polar coordinates for the integration variables. By the same argu-
ment, the second and third accessibility measures can be computed as
f2(r; ') = 2
Z b
0
 
r4 + 4r2s2 + s4

(s) sds
f3(r; ') = 4
2
Z b
0
Z b
0
 
r2 + s2
  
r2 + t2

(s)(t) stdsdt
s and t 2 [0; b] are distance-to-origin coordinates of the integration variables. Obviously,
those accessibility measures depend only on r. Because the spatial distribution (r) of
20
the circular city also depend only on r, the indirect utility V (r; ') depends only on r.
The circular city is therefore consistent with a spatial equilibrium.
The urban structure of the circular city is derived in the same way as in the linear city.
Note that, by Lemma1, spatial distributions are 4th-order polynomials of the Cartesian
coordinates (x1; x2). In addition, to satisfy circular symmetry, this should be a polynomial
function of r2 = x21 +x
2
2; that is, it should have the following form: a4(x
2
1 +x
2
2)
2 + a2(x
2
1 +
x22) + a0. So, the class of spatial distributions that satisfy that is 4th-order polynomials
and has circular symmetry is given by (r) = a4r4+a2r2+a0. As a result, the equilibrium
spatial distributions (r) of a circular must also have a zero slope at its peak (0(0) = 0).
This property results from the combination of circular symmetry and quadratic transport
costs (which drives Lemma1).
We assume again that the (farming) opportunity cost of land is nil so that the land
rent is nil at the city border: (b) = 0.
The spatial equilibrium is then dened by a spatial distribution function (r), a city
border b and a utility level V

that solve the three equalities V (r) = V

, (b) = 0 andR 
 
R b
 b 
(r)rd'dr = 1 where the last integral is equal to 2
R b
 b 
(r)rdr: As before, the
rst equality can be used to give the following necessary conditions
V 0(r) = 0; V 00(r) = 0; V 000(r) = 0; V 0000(r) = 0 8r 2 [0; b]
which can be applied at r = 0 to nd the coe¢ cients (a0;a2; a4). The equilibrium is
obtained in the same way as in the case of a linear city, except that the conditions
V 0(r) = 0 and V 000(r) = 0 are already satised because of the circular symmetry. On the
one hand, simultaneously solving V 0000(x) = 0; (b) = 0 and 2
R b
 b 
(r)rdr = 1; we get
the workersspatial distribution  given by expression (14) where the parameters are
now given by
a0 =
b6 + 6
3b2
, a2 =  4b
6 + 6
3b4
and a4 =  (19)
and where  is dened exactly as in (15). On the other hand, plugging (19) into V 00(x) = 0,
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the city border is given by the equality g (b) = 0 where
g (b) = 11522(2 + )42   11522(2 + )2(3 + 2)b4 (20)
+ 96(2 + )2
 
482 + 40 + 52

 2b6
  42  62 + 6 + 2  242 + 16 + 2  4b12
which is a polynomial equation of order 12. This solution is very similar to the one
obtained for the linear city. The existence and uniqueness of b are given by the same
argument and shown in Appendix 1(b). So, we can make a proposition similar to Propo-
sition 1.
Proposition 3 There exists a two-dimension equilibrium distribution  (x) with circular
symmetry and with a single peak with zero slope.
It can be veried that the comparative static properties are the same as in the case
of a linear city. Because the urban structures of linear and planar cities have very similar
properties, the present analysis can be seen as a validation for the generality of studies
that focuses on linear cities.
Up to now, we have examined the impacts of nal demand linkages on the urban
structure. We now extend the model to vertical linkages in order to fully consider forward
and backward linkages.
7 Final demand versus vertical linkages
The previous model combines nal demand and vertical linkages. Final demand linkages
result from the fact that each rm prefer to save transport costs by locating closer to
its consumers, whereas vertical linkages result from the fact that each rm prefers to
locate closer the rms that purchase its good as intermediate input. In this section, we
disentangle the two e¤ects and discuss their roles on the formation of urban structure.
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Towards this aim, we alter the preference for the di¤erentiated products or services
and assume that the composite good function is now given by
Cm [q (; x)] = 
Z
X
q(y; x)(y)dy   
2m
Z
X
[q(y; x)]2 (y)dy   
2m
Z
X
q(y; x)(y)dy
2
(21)
where m is a demand multiplier for the consumer demand. Indeed, one can readily show
that the consumer demand is then equal to
qcm(y; x) = m


 + 
  1

p(y; x) +

 ( + )
P (x)

= mqc(y; x)
while the consumer surplus becomes Sm [p (; x)] = mS [p (; x)]. That is, the consumer
demand and surplus are proportional to m.
Similarly, we assume that the capital requirement is given by K   Ck [q (; x)] where
we dene Ck [q (; x)] as in (21) and where k is the demand multiplier for the intermediate
input demands. The demand for intermediate inputs is then equal to qik(y; x) = kq
i(y; x)
and the capital saving becomes Sk [p (; x)] = kS [p (; x)]. The demand for intermediate
inputs and the savings in capital expenditures rise in the same proportion as k.
Under the above assumptions, each rm faces a demand that is equal to qt(y; x) =
qcm(y; x)+q
i
k(y; x) = (m+ k) q
c(y; x). Since the parameters m and k have a multiplicative
e¤ect on demand, it has the same multiplicative e¤ect on the operating prots. As a result,
each rm sets its prices to p (y; x) = p (x) + 1
2
 (y; x) that are dened in expression (7)
and are invariant to the demand multipliers m and k. At the equilibrium, the operating
prot is equal to
m+ k

Z
X
[p (y; x)   (y; x)]2  (x) dx = (m+ k) e
(y)
2
The location incentives are given by the following indirect utility:
V (x) = (m+ k)

S [p (; x)] + e
(x)
2

  (x) K + q0
When m = k = 1, this expression reduces to expression (10). Because location incentives
are given by utility di¤erentials, the constant  K+q0 has no impact on location. Dividing
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each term by m + k, one readily infer that a rise of m + k has the same impact as a fall
of . Since preferences for residential space generate a dispersion force, the rise of m+ k
leads to less dispersion. We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Stronger demands for nal products or services and/or for intermediate
products or services leads to stronger nal demand linkages and/or stronger vertical link-
ages, which both increase the density of rms near the city center and reduce the city
spread.
This analysis reects the individuals trade-o¤ between her demand for residential
space, her consumption and her income. Both e¤ects on consumption and production
tend to increase rmsand workersconcentration in the vicinity of the city center. When
m increases, individuals have larger demands for products or services. This entices rms
to save transport costs by locating closer to consumers and to pull their workers closer
to the city center. When k increases, rms are able to make larger savings in capital
requirements and therefore have larger demand for intermediate products or services.
Larger demands for intermediate inputs entice rms to locate closer to each other and
save on transport costs. So, rms can raise their operating prots through larger capital
savings and through a better proximity to their clients. Finally, because labor markets
clear, rms prots are shifted to workers whose higher incomes are used to pay the
higher residential rents near the city center. Note that, under the present specication,
nal demand linkages and vertical linkages have the same e¤ects on rmslocations.
We now study the socially optimal distribution of rms and workers. For the sake of
simplicity, we set again k = m = 1.
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8 Social optimum
In this section we study the optimal distribution of individuals and rms. We assume
that a utilitarian planner allocates residential land to individuals and allows rms to set
their product prices. The planner therefore sets the spatial distribution of residents  ()
and the city support Bo that maximizes the sum of utilities

 
Z
Bo
V o(x) (x) dx
subject to the population constraint
R
Bo (x)dx = 1 where V
o(x) is the utility of the
individual residing at location x when rms and workers are distributed according to
 (x) and when product prices are set by rms. For the sake of exposition we focus on
the linear city that spreads on the support Bo  ( bo; bo).
We have seen before that, for any given distribution of individuals and rms, con-
sumersproduct demands and rmsintermediate input demands are independent of the
individualsuse of residential space.5 Therefore, it can readily be shown that demand
for products is una¤ected by the fact that residential land is now allocated by a planner.
Using the same product prices as before, the individual utility can be written as
V o(x)  2S [p (; x)] + e(x) + q0  K  

2
1
s(x)
which includes again the individuals consumer surplus S [p (; x)], her income stemming
for the operating prots e(x) minus capital expenditure K S [p (; x)], and her preference
for residential space =2s(x). Using the indirect utility with a land market V (x) as given
by (4), we get
V o(x) = V (x) +

2
1
s(x)
= V (x) +

2
(x) (22)
5That is, product prices p(x; y) do not depend on s(x) or . Changes in the residential market are
absorbed by the individualsconsumptions of the numéraire good and the rmsrequirement of physical
capital K   S.
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The last term results for land market ine¢ ciencies. Intuitively, for a same spatial distrib-
ution (x), individuals raise their utility by 
2
1
s(x)
= 
2
(x) if they do not pay (to absentee
landlords) for their use of residential space. The planner indeed receives the whole surplus
from the use of residential space whereas a competitive land market allows individuals
to receive only the di¤erence between this surplus and the land rents. This e¤ect is the
greatest for individuals residing at the city center and nil for the individual residing at the
city edge ((0) > (b) = 0). The planner is therefore willing to increase the residential
density about the city center so that this e¤ect represents an agglomeration force.
The planners incentives to allocate residents can be understood as it follows. For the
sake of accuracy, let us express the utility as V (x; ) where  is the spatial distribution
function. Let  be the Lagrange multiplier of the population constraint
R
X (x)dx = 1.
Because of the unit mass population, this multiplier expresses the marginal increase in
average utility that would be induced by a marginal immigration of individuals within
the city. Then, pointwise maximization of the plannersobjective 
 with respect to the
density function  (z) yields the following rst-order condition:
W (x)  V o (x; )   +
Z
Bo
@V o (z; )
@ (x)
 (z) dz = 0
So, the relocation of (an innitesimal mass of) individuals into location z has two direct
and indirect e¤ects. On the one hand, it increases total welfare if the location z yields a
higher utility than in other locations; or more precisely, if individuals at location z have
a higher utility than , the marginal increase in average utility induced by immigration.
On the other hand, the relocation of individuals into location z induces a relocation of
rms that can improve the consumersaverage access to products and services and thus
that can increase the average utility. Under the Ottaviano et al.s (2002) preferences,
rms trade o¤ between the access to their consumers and the intensity of competition
with other rms. Whereas the former e¤ect entices them to co-agglomerate, the latter
e¤ect entices them to disperse. Under such a relocation of rms, the access gains for some
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consumers many larger than the access losses to others. The planner can use lump sump
transfers of numeraire to restore equity amongst individuals. In Appendix 3, the latter
contribution can be computed from (11) as it follows:Z
Bo
@V o (z; )
@ (x)
 (z) dz = V o (x; ) W0   2W4f3 (x; )  (W3  W4) [f1 (x; )]2
where
W3  W4 =  2 8 + 3
4 (2 + )2
> 0
Note that the rmsrelocation to location z increases the average utility in proportion
to the local utility V o (z; ) at z. The relationship between the increase of the average
utility and local utility results from the symmetry of transport costs and the linearity
in  of the access measures. In other words, because transport cost are symmetric, a
better access to products and services o¤ered at location z by consumers located at x is
equal to the access to products and services o¤ered at x by consumers located at z. As
a result, the rmsrelocation to z implies an increase in the average access f1 given byR
Bo
@f1(x;)
@(z)
 (x) dx, which is equal to
R
Bo T (z   x) (x) dx, or equivalently, f1 (z; ). The
same argument applies for f2. The terms in the access measure f 21 and f3 in the above
expression stem from the nonlinearities in  of f 21 and f3.
Using (22), the rst-order condition for optimum can be rewritten as
W (x) = 2V (x; ) + (x)  2W4f3 (x; )  (W3  W4) [f1 (x; )]2   constant = 0 (23)
which expresses an impact of a marginal increase in the density function  (z) at location
z on the plannersobjective 
.
We now characterize the optimal spatial distribution in more details. Similar to
Lemma 1 for the equilibrium distribution, we can readily show that the optimal dis-
tribution (x) is also a polynomial function of order 4. This is because (11) and (23)
are similar in that both are linear combinations of f1(x), f2(x), f3(x), [f1(x)]
2 and (x).
Furthermore, from Lemma 2 o(b) = 0, where bo is the optimal border,
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Solving the integral equation (23) using the same method, we obtain the optimal
distribution given by
o(x) = o
h 
x2   co1
2   (co2)2i (24)
where
co1 
24 (bo)5 o + 15
40 (bo)3 o
and co2 
15  16 (bo)5 o
40 (bo)3 o
and
o  
2

242 + 16 + 2
8 (2 + )2
One can check that the optimal distribution o(x) is also single-peaked and concave.
Because the optimal distribution o(x) given by (24) is qualitatively similar to the equi-
librium one (x) (14), the same comparative statics can be applied.
Next, the rst-order condition (23) encompasses both ine¢ ciencies in the land market
and in the rmslocation decisions. The main question is whether the spatial equilib-
rium implies too much dispersion or too much concentration. In order to answer to this
question, plug the equilibrium distribution (x) into (23):
(x)  2W4f3 (x; )  (W3  W4) [f1 (x; )]2   constant (25)
Because (x) is symmetric about x = 0 and decreasing in x 2 [0; b], f1 (x; ) and
f3 (x; 
) can be shown to be symmetric about x = 0 and increasing in x 2 [0; b]. Hence,
(25), which is an impact of a marginal increase in  (x) at x on 
, is a decreasing function
of x. This implies that the planner has more incentives to increase the density (x) at
locations closer to the city center x = 0 than at the city edge x = b. Finally, because
the population is constant, the expression (25)must be positive at x = 0 and negative
at x = b so that the planner increases the population density at the city center and
decreases at the city edge. We have therefore proved the following proposition:
Proposition 5 The city is too much dispersed at the equilibrium.
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Excessive dispersion results from two e¤ects. First, the land market does not allow
residents to extract the full surplus from their residential lots. Second, rms tends disperse
too much in equilibrium in order to reduce competition. In addition, as in new economic
geography, there exist the pecuniary externalities that are positive accruing from nal
demand linkages. Because rms do not fully take the externalities into account, they
tend to be dispersed as compared to the social optimum. This nding coincides with the
literature on face-to-face communications (Ogawa and Fujita, 1980; Tauchen and Witte,
1984; and Tabuchi, 1986).
9 Conclusion
To our knowledge this paper presents the rst formal discussion of the endogenous urban
structure of a city that is subject to endogenous backward and forward linkages. Workers
consume the goods or services they produce while they must rent their residential lots
in an urban land market. Firms produce under increasing returns to scale and sell their
di¤erentiated goods in markets where demand and supply balance. As in most modern
cities, rms are subject to vertical linkages, which we model in the spirit of Krugman and
Venables (1995). The production and market structures are exactly the same as those
found in standard new economic geography models (Krugman, 1991; Ottaviano et al.,
2002).
We showed that rms and workers co-agglomerate about a city center symmetrically
with a single peak. We examined the shape of the residential distribution in such cities on
a one- and two-dimension geographical space (linear city and planar city). We extended
the model to disentangle the e¤ect of nal demand and vertical linkages and veried that
those two e¤ects are complement. Finally, we showed that the city is too dispersed from
a social point of view.
The present model therefore conrms a series of properties that are known in the exist-
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ing urban literature or expected from the new economic geography literature. The present
paper also shows that the combination of specic transport costs and preferences for space
o¤ers a good level of analytical tractability. This parallels the tractability properties of
address models of spatial competition (Anderson et al. 1992),where the transport cost is a
quadratic function of distance, but where consumers are nevertheless immobile. As those
properties permit to determine spatial equilibrium conditions in one- or two-dimensional
spaces without the recourse to numerical exercises, they also o¤er some research per-
spectives for extensions in various directions such as rst-best allocations, labor market
specicities, system of cities and possibly endogenous commuting. In particular, multiple
city centers are likely to arise when rms incur a too high shipping cost to distant places
or when workers are able to commute to rms. At the present stage, those extensions are
left for further research.
Appendix 1
(a) Linear city
We prove the uniqueness of the city border b. First, note that at the city border b,
it must be that 0(b)  0. Indeed, if 0(b) > 0, this implies that (b   ") < 0 for any
su¢ ciently small positive " 2 [0; b], a contradiction. Hence, by (18), the city border b
must be lower than 5
p
15=16. Second, we show that @g(b)=@b < 0 at b = b and that
b < 5
p
15=16. Indeed, di¤erentiating g(b) with respect to b and substituting the solution
in  of g(b) = 0 the result yields
@g(b)
@b
=  C2
b

b5   15
16
"
b5   15
16
 
1 +
 (4 + )
2
 
92 + 2 + 7
!#
where C2 is a positive constant. This expression is negative for all b < 5
p
15=16.
(b) Planar city
The uniqueness of the city border b in the planar city is similarly shown as in (a). We
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know that 0(b)  0. The counterpart of (18) is given by
0(b) < 0 () b < 6
r
3

(26)
We then show that dg(b)=db < 0 whenever g(b) = 0 and b < 6
p
3=. Plugging the
solution in  of g(b) = 0 into dg(b)=db yields
dg(b)
db
=  C3

b6   3


b6   3


1 +
8 + 32
242 + 16 + 2

where C3 is a positive constant. This expression in negative for all b < 6
p
3=.
Appendix 2
It is convenient to substitute the variables (b; ) by (b; r) where
r = 2
2 + 

b2 (27)
By the feasible exchange condition (9) we have that r < 1. Therefore, we dene h(b; r) 
g (b) where we replace  by (27). So,
h(b; r) = 15752 (2 + )4 2   105
2

12 (10  3r) 2 + 4(35  8r) + 5(8  r)223r b
  2
 
62 + 6 + 2
  
92 + 7 + 2

44r4 b2
(2 + )4
which is positive (h(0; r) > 0) and strictly concave (quadratic) in b (@2h=@b2 < 0). For
each given r, h(b; r) therefore accepts one and only one positive root b = b+(r), where
b+(r) =
15 (2 + )4

C4(r) +
p
7C5(r)

8
 
62 + 6 + 2
  
92 + 7 + 2

2r3
> 0 r 2 (0; 1) (28)
and
C4(r)   84 (10  3r) 2   28 (35  8r)    35 (8  r) 2 < 0
C5(r)  720
 
140  84r + 15r2 4 + 480  490  259r + 40r2 3
+ 8
 
25550  11410r + 1439r2 22
+ 8
 
9800  3465r + 332r2 3 +  11200  2800r + 207r2 4
> 0
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It can be easily veried that (C4(r))
2 < 7C5(r).
Substituting (??) and (28) into 0(b), we have
00(b)j= r
2(2+)b2
; b=b+ = C6

C7 + 3
p
7C5

where C6 > 0 and
C7   360 (7  2r) 2   28 (105  23r)    (840  101r) 2 < 0
It can be shown that (C7)
2 < 327C5, and hence, 
00(b+) < 0 for all relevant parameter
values.
We know that (x) is a polynomial of order 4 and is symmetric about a single peak
at x = 0 from (14). Furthermore, 0(b) < 0 and 00(b) < 0. Hence, it must be that
00(x) < 0 for all x 2 ( b; b).
Appendix 3
To get the value of
R
X
@V o(z;)
@(x)
 (z) dz, where V o(z) = V (z) + 
2
(z), we rst compute
@
@ (x)
f1(z; ) = (x  z)2
@
@ (x)
f2(z; ) = (x  z)4
@
@ (x)
f3(z; ) =
@
@ (x)
Z
XX
(z   y)2 (y   w)2  (y) (w) dydw

=
Z
X
(z   x)2 (x  w)2  (w) dw +
Z
X
(z   y)2 (y   x)2  (y) dy
Then, by integrating on the support X , we getZ
X
@
@ (x)
f1(z; ) (z) dz =
Z
X
(x  z)2  (z) dz = f1(x; )Z
X
@
@ (x)
f2(z; ) (z) dz =
Z
X
(x  z)4  (z) dz = f2(x; )Z
X
@
@ (x)
f3(z; ) (z) dz =
Z
XX
(z   x)2 (x  w)2  (w) (z) dwdz
+
Z
XX
(z   y)2 (y   x)2  (y) (z) dydz
= [f1(x; )]
2 + f3(x; )
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and Z
X
@
@ (x)
[f1(z; )]
2  (z) dz = 2
Z
X
f1(z; )
@
@ (x)
[f1(z; )] (z) dz
= 2
Z
X
f1(z; ) (x  z)2  (z) dz
= 2f3 (x; )
Hence,Z
X
@V o (z; )
@ (x)
 (z) dz =  W1f1(x) +W2f2(x)  (W3 + 2W4) f3 (x; ) W3 [f1(x; )]2   W5
2
 (x)
= V o (x; ) W0   2W4f3 (x; )  (W3  W4) [f1 (x; )]2
Furthermore, we have that
V o (x; )   +
Z
X
@V o (z; )
@ (x)
 (z) dz = 0
Therefore, the rst-order condition is given by (23).
Appendix 4
Lemma 2 maxb 
 implies that o(bo) = 0, generically.
Proof: Let assume that (x) is the optimal distribution o(x) (we drop the superscript o
for the sake of readability). Let us denote the indirect utility V o (x) and access measures
fi (x), i = 1; 2; 3, by V o (x; b) and fi (x; b) to express their dependence with respect to the
city border b. We know that (x) is symmetric about x = 0: (x) = ( x), x 2 Bo. As a
result, all access measures f1 (x; b), f2 (x; b), f3 (x; b) and [f1 (x; b)]
2 and therefore V o (x; b)
are also symmetric about x = 0.
The rst-order condition of the optimum b is given by
@

@b
= 2V o (b; b) (b) +
Z b
 b
@
@b
V o (x; b) (x) dx = 0
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We compute
@
@b
V o (x; b) =
@
@b
V (x; b)
=  W1 @
@b
f1 (x; b) +W2
@
@b
f2 (x; b) W3 @
@b
f3 (x; b)
  2W4f1 (x; b) @
@b
f1 (x; b)
where
@
@b
f1 (x; b) = [T (x  b) + T (x+ b)] (b)
@
@b
f2 (x; b) =

T (x  b)2 + T (x+ b)2 (b)
@
@b
f3 (x; b) =
@
@b
Z b
 b
Z b
 b
T (x  y)T (y   z) (y) (z) dydz
= 2 (b)
Z b
 b
[[T (x  z) + T (x  b)]T (z   b) + [T (x  z) + T (x+ b)]T (z + b)] (z) dz
Thus, we get Z b
 b
@
@b
V o (x; b) (x) dx =  (b)F (b)
where
F (b)   W1
Z b
 b
[T (x  b) + T (x+ b)] (x) dx+W2
Z b
 b

T (x  b)2 + T (x+ b)2 (x) dx
 W3
Z b
 b
Z b
 b
[[T (x  z) + T (x  b)]T (z   b) + [T (x  z) + T (x+ b)]T (z + b)] (z) (x) dzdx
  2W4
Z b
 b
f1 (x; b) [T (x  b) + T (x+ b)] (x) dx
As a result,
@

@b
= 2 (b) [V o (b; b) + F (b)]
Because V o (b; b) + F (b) is generically di¤erent from zero, it must be that  (b) = 0.
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